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ABSTRACT
This research combines Institutional Rational Choice (IRC), the Institutional Analysis and
Development (IAD) framework, Return Migration theories and International Development theories
to understand how Mozambican highly skilled returnees (HSRs) interact with the institutional
setting in the home country while pursuing their personal aspirations. Institutional setting in this
context is defined as a multidimensional space of factors – institutions plus other contextual
variables co-evolving as they interact with each other – in which HSRs try to mobilize resources over
time towards their personal goals. Factors impose elements of order in the context where they
operate and they affect the distribution of preferences, incentives, and outcomes. A better
understanding of the constraints imposed by these factors/elements on HSRs’ behavior and
personal satisfaction could allow governments in extremely poor countries to prioritize
interventions for institutional development given the very scarce resources available. These could
have the interacting effect of increasing the capacity of HSRs to contribute to the development of
Mozambique and provide positive signals to encourage the return of more. Hypotheses around
three specific types of factors/domains – professional opportunities, information and
communication technologies (ICTs), and governmental programs – are tested. The methodology
applied includes (i) a cross-sectional purposive sample of Mozambicans who recently returned to the
home country after obtaining post-secondary education abroad; (ii) an online survey complemented
with field interviews; (iii) bivariate analysis; and (iv) multivariate model-building. The results
demonstrate, first, that all three factors tested are associated with retention. This finding supports
the IAD’s argument that new policies and institutions can be devised to shape those other
contextual variables. Second, this research demonstrates that the degree of this association differs
across factors. Third, this research shows that the degree of association also differs from urban to
rural settings. Moreover, the first and foremost role played by professional-related elements in the
capacity of a country to retain some of its most well-educated citizens supports previous literature.
Further, this research supports the argument that institutional development precedes economic
development. Also, this research does not find empirical support for the hypothesis that
Mozambique has been facing increasing levels of the brain drain. In addition, the “Satisfaction With
Life Scale” (SWLS) proxy for retention is among all proxies tested the one mostly associated with
the institutional setting in the home country. More specifically, the possibility of achieving personal
goals is the most important component of one’s overall life satisfaction. Finally, there is a temporal
“ripple-effect” on the association (i.e., progressively weaker) of the current institutional setting
both with past and with the possibility of future behavior. The implications resulting from these
findings are discussed and classified into three categories: (i) theoretical; (ii) practical for policy; and
(iii) for future research.
Key Words: Highly Skilled migration, brain drain inversion, patterns of reintegration, institutional
development, Mozambique
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THE PROBLEM
Introduction
The ultimate explanatory variable of development is the education level of communities and nations
(Fukuyama 1992; Huntington 1993). More specifically, Fukuyama (1992) argues that knowledge is
“the key to the directionality of history” (ibid., p. 72). This is so because “science regulates the
direction of economic development by establishing a constantly changing horizon of production
possibilities” (ibid., p. 77). Moreover, closely intertwined with this expansion of the technological
horizon is an increasingly rational organization of labor favored by “an adequate supply of skilled
labor” (ibid.).
As part of their continuing struggle with persistent, pervasive poverty, African countries have
systematically been facing rates of emigration of well-educated citizens increasingly larger than the
corresponding rates of immigration (Carrington and Detragiache 1998; Docquier and Marfouk
2004). This condition has been characterized as the “brain drain” phenomenon. Some 130 million
people worldwide are living outside the country of their birth, and “in the context of globalization
the number of migrants is generally presumed to be growing” (Black et al. 2003, 5).The authorsp.
also estimate that 30 percent of the most highly educated African nationals, defined as possessing a
post-secondary education, live outside their countries of origin.
Although extreme poverty fell globally from 1.5 billion persons in 1981 to 1.1 billion in 2001, sub-
Saharan Africa was not part of this positive development (Chen and Ravallion 2004). This region was
the only one facing a dramatic increase – it doubled – and is currently the home of approximately 30
percent of those 1.1 billion.
The World Bank (WB) defines “extreme poverty” as living on less than US$1 per day (PPP) . In¹
general terms, and within the context of this research, “persistent extreme poverty” in Africa refers
to situations where successive generations of families have not succeeded in increasing their living
standards above that threshold in the post-independence period (Carter and Barrett 2006).
Mozambique has been facing increasing levels of the brain drain phenomenon with
disproportionate levels of less educated living in Mozambique. From 1990 to 2000, (i) the
percentage of educated emigrants to total population (25 years plus) in the country quadrupled
from 0.04 percent to 0.16 percent; (ii) the percentage of educated emigrants to total educated
population more than doubled from 36.26 percent to 82.24 percent (nearly 45 percent of all
university-graduated Mozambicans live abroad), meaning that Mozambique has been increasingly
losing its highly skilled, educated human resources; and (iii) the percentage of educated emigrants
to total emigrants quintupled from 3.57 percent to 17.73 percent, suggesting that emigration
opportunities were increasingly accruing to the most educated members of society, to the
disadvantage of the less educated left at home (Docquier and Marfouk 2004) .²
1
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) theory suggests co-movements of changes in the exchange rate with the inflation
differential of two countries. The average U.S. citizen earned $127 (PPP) per day in 2009 (IMF 2009).
2
World Bank. Database on Brain Drain at http://go.worldbank.org/9YZ0EKSMT0.
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The basic problem is that the welfare of nation and those left behind could readily diminish because
the social return to migrants' education exceeds their private returns. Moreover, given that
education is often partly publicly financed, the brain drain phenomenon has been recognized to be
injurious to most African nations (Beine et al. 2001).
Countries of origin have to create incentive mechanisms to encourage their most well-educated and
skilled citizens to return and remain in the home country, so they can more actively participate in its
economic-social development. Within this context, it is important to understand the returnee's
motivations, behavior, and patterns of reintegration (Patinkin 1968; Thomas-Hope 1999; Dustmann
and Kirchkamp 2002; Cassarino 2004) . This process of return and retention of highly skilled citizens³
was a fundamental means for the development of some Asian nations in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s,
such as Japan, Singapore, Republic of Taiwan, and Republic of Korea (Iredale and Guo 2001).
Patinkin's “Nationalist Model” of development specifically addresses the relationship between
brain drain and opportunities for scientific activities in the home country. This author's emphasis in
on “what the underdeveloped countries can themselves do to diminish the brain drain” (p. 95). This
model encompasses three interrelated aspects: (i) the countries must encourage their trained
scientific personnel to identify with the development of the country; (ii) the countries must show
that these people can indeed fulfill a vital role in that development; and (iii) the countries must
provide at least minimally for them to fulfill their scientific aspirations.
Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika puts it this way: “We find a way to reduce brainmust the
drain is an open wound nation” The highly educated and skilled. It that infects our (Nguyen 2006).
“are the very ones that Third World countries can least afford to lose” (Todaro 1985, 123).p.
Referring to diasporas and returnees' initiatives, Riddle and Nielsen (20 , 23) observe “countries11 p.
of origin should identify the key obstacles investors face.”
Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) addressed the potential role of returnees to improve a country's
capacity to induce change and foster development. In their words, “the returnees would also bring
home far more benefits than their wage alone: experience, entrepreneurship, funds to invest, and
an increased work ethic” (p. 151). However, to make sure these benefits are realized, states must
generate incentives for the workers to return and stay (Brown 2000).
Rodrik (1996) examined the clear success of Republic of Korea and People's Republic of China in the
second half of the 20 century, in particular how “the sharp increases in physical and human capital
th
as well as in labor-force participation account for virtually all the rise in output” (p. 13). Further,
Cerase (1974, 259) argued more than 30 years ago that the returnee's “will, his means, and hisp.
belief are new and, strictly speaking, innovative.” The returnee “aims to disrupt the old equilibrium
in the local power structures” (ibid., p. 258). Iredale and Guo (2001, 1) agree, albeit on a morep.
diffuse national context: “A study on the return migration of Yemenis from Saudi Arabia found that
3
The term “development” here used refers to variations on the United Nations’ (UN) Human Development Index (HDI)
that measures a country’s average achievements in three basic dimensions of human development: life expectancy,
educational attainment, and adjusted real income ($PPP per person).
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upon their return, many people invested in small business such as convenience stores, but there was
no analysis of the processes or of the interaction between the returning migrants and the society at
large.” They call for study of the interaction of personal networks with contextual factors and they
write, “there has been little work on impacts” of highly skilled returnees (ibid.). Harvey (2009, 2)p.
concurs, “there has been a disappointing level of analysis of highly skilled migrants returning to their
home countries.”
The highly skilled returnee (HSR) interacts with the context at home because s/he is motivated to
pursue personal goals that guided the return (Iredale and Guo 2001; Doreian 2006) . These personal⁴
goals can be multiple, of any kind (e.g., finding a job, creating a company, having land, supporting the
family), and change over time. Analyzing the factors shaping highly skilled returnees' adaptive
inclination (e.g., what are the barriers, constraints, difficulties, favoring factors) should shed light on
the reasons for which their patterns of reintegration at home and their capacity to adaptively invest
their skills in the local context differ.
Complementarily, knowing how HSRs interact with the indigenous contextual structure to pursue
their personal aspirations will inform governments about how to prioritize development policies
towards HSRs' retention. These could have the interacting effect of increasing the capacity of HSRs
to contribute to the development of Mozambique and provide positive signals to encourage the
return of more.
Research Focus and Question
The return and retention problem just described emphasizes three critical features. First, it
emphasizes the broad socio-economic, political, and cultural structure which HSRs are embedded in
(i.e., the contextual factors of Africa and, more specifically, of Mozambique). Second, it emphasizes
the HSRs' patterns of reintegration through which personal goals in Mozambique are pursued (i.e.,
HSRs' decisions and behavior in the home country). Lastly, it emphasizes the relationship that can be
established between contextual factors and behavior.
Even though this research takes HSRs' return as a given and therefore not being directly about
factors influencing that decision, factors influencing retention (e.g., job opportunities, education
system, dynamic markets) may also encourage more to return . This research proposes to address a⁵
single research question (RQ), which is broken down into four hypotheses introduced throughout
the literature review (i.e. what factors affect retention of HSRs in Mozambique?)
Research Relevance
It is relevant from a conceptual point of view to study and bridge persistent poverty with contextual
factors and HSRs. The trend to move from a macroeconomic to a more micro analysis of social,
4
“HSRs” here used refers to those who have returned from overseas after earning an advanced degree (i.e., post-
secondary education).
5
Within the context of this research “retention” does not imply confinement of HSRs’ operations to Mozambican
geographic boundaries. It implies that HSRs have their residency in Mozambique but it includes situations of “brain
sharing” (i.e., situation in which activities are carried out in and out of Mozambique) (Saxenian 2005).
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political, and economic groups and individual behaviors has been defended by several authors that
argue that studying social structures in discrete settings is a key to understand political and
economic change and development (Granovetter 1973, 1985; Williamson 1985; Ostrom 1990, 2008).
This research is also relevant from a theoretical perspective. On one hand, it is a theory-exploring
research viewed through four hypotheses; on the other, it bridges four different theoretical fields –
Institutional Rational Choice, Return Migration Theory, International Development theories, and
Happiness Studies – with the goal of explaining which are the factors most likely to affect retention
of HSRs According to Cassarino (2004, 253) “the growing diversity of migratory categories –.⁶ p.
ranging from economic migrants to refugees and asylum seekers – necessitates a distinction
between the various types of returnees”. This author adds, “we still need to know who returns
when, and why; and why some returnees appear as agents of change, in specific social and institutional
circumstances at home, whereas others not” [emphases added]. Sun (1999) concurs that previous
research on returnees has focused on the process of their return to the origin country, while how
they were re-integrated as active members of society after their return has been assumed to be
“problem free”.
It is also salient from a policy-making standpoint to study and bridge persistent poverty with
contextual factors and HSRs. The phenomena of technological, social, political, and economical
globalization increases peoples' and societies' awareness of events and realities happening globally.
On one hand, governments of developing countries are becoming increasingly exposed to the
international community and to their own people, which raises new issues of political efficiency and
accountability. On the other hand, governments and non-profits from more developed countries
face an increasing pressure from their citizens and stakeholders to improve the efficiency of their
foreign aid policies. For example, Hulme and Shepard (2003, 3) write:p.
In the last few years national and international commitments to poverty-reduction
have reached levels that could barely have been imagined ten years ago. Most world
leaders have committed their countries to ambitious targets for reducing global
poverty, national governments are drafting Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
(PRSPs), and international agencies are focusing their attention on mobilizing
resources and influencing policies that will provide pro-poor growth and alleviate
poverty.
Contrary to what was the aspiration of the UN's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) , extreme⁷
poverty will not be eradicated by 2015. Therefore, we ask, on what terms, and under which principles
and guidelines, will the international agenda on poverty for the period after 2015 be developed? The
scholars around the world continue to learn from a century of research on development and growth,
of policy experimentations, of successful and unsuccessful practices, and of desired and undesired
6
For an emphasis on multidisciplinary approach to Policy Sciences, see Lasswell (1971).
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outcomes (Samuelson 1954; Galbraith 1987; Putnam 1992; Herbst 2000; Sen 2006). This research
aims to contribute to this global involvement towards eradication of extreme poverty and human
suffering in sub-Saharan Africa, in general, and Mozambique, in particular, through the lens of HSRs.
This research is the first study ever developed about retention of HSRs in Mozambique. For the first
time, Mozambican policy-makers will have access to a data-driven relationship with which to inform
policies aimed at retaining some of their nation's most well educated citizens. Problems with the
“Migration de Retour au Maghreb Projet” (MiReM) (2007) in northern African nations are instructive
in this sense. More specifically, in this report on return migration to Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia,⁸
the statistical sources do not provide a comprehensive, precise vision regarding the socio-
demographic characteristics of the returnees, nor do they allow the return migration phenomenon
and the link between return migration and development in migrants' countries of origin to be
properly understood and analyzed. Moreover, owing to the fragmentary nature of the data, used
sources do not sufficiently inform the reader about return migration in at least two aspects: (i) the
motivations, factors and circumstances that led migrants to return their country of origin; and (ii) the
migrants' resources and patterns of reintegration in their country of origin, as well as their respective
impact on the local and domestic economy.
Within the context of development policies, it is particularly relevant to focus on HSRs. As human
capital is viewed as a major factor for development, a positive change in the stock of this factor
should induce further development (Fukuyama 1992; Huntington 1993). Viewing HSRs as a positive
flow of human capital back “home”, attempts to study this phenomenon should contribute to
illuminate certain development mechanisms. For Huntington, the ultimate explanatory variable for
the democratization wave occurring in the last quarter of the 20th century was the political
entrepreneur emerging from better educated and prepared elites. Referring to Africa, Guest (2004,
3) writes that it is “A continent in need of leadership”. For instance, a survey of elite return migrants
to Ghana and Ivory Cost revealed that being an “advocate for community” was perceived as the
most important type of change they introduced in their home country after returning (Black et al.
2003).
From a methodological point of view, this research melds quantitative and qualitative research
techniques to illuminate results and inform conclusions. From an empirical perspective, this research
is the most complete effort to date to create a database of highly skilled Mozambicans (HSMs) who
studied or are still studying abroad. More than fifteen hundred have been identified.
Summarizing, Ostrom (1999) seems to support research focusing on behavioral and contextual
aspects of highly skilled people when writing, “Far more important is a deep understanding of … the
capacity of citizens to learn entrepreneurial and to undertake important economic and social
activities relying primarily on their own skills” (p. xv).
8
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THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Institutional Creation, Role, and Change in Institutional Rational Choice (IRC)
In IRC, institutions are created on the understanding that two or more people can be better off by
acting together (i.e., cooperating), within an institutional setting (Buchanan and Tullock 1965;
Ostrom et al. 1994; Axelrod 1997). There are five basic sources for these gains that apply to different
degrees across all institutional designs (Beinhocker 2006): (i) the increments in productivity
resulting from the division of labor (e.g., information-processing, cities, armies, factories); (ii) the
new possibilities of trading mutual benefits as a result of a more heterogeneous pool of tastes and
preferences (e.g., markets, civil organizations); (iii) the benefits of increasing returns on scale (e.g.,
knowledge sharing, friends, languages, hierarchies); (iv) the smoothness of uncertainties over time
(e.g., trust, contracts, family); and (v) the reduction of transaction costs (e.g., agreements, laws,
constitutions).
Given the natural tension between cooperation and self-interest (Wright 2000), two conditions must
occur to encourage people to act together: (i) a distributive mechanism to allocate and share
payoffs; and (ii) a management mechanism to deal with defection and free-riding (i.e., illicit benefit
from a public resource either due to excessive consumption or unfair participation in its production
costs). This tension between cooperation and self-interest, and the interconnection between
institutions themselves, clarifies the critical role that the rule of law (i.e., mechanisms for
enforcement and adjudication) plays for a well functioning of formal and informal institutions (North
1990). For example, Ostrom (1990; 2008) focuses on the institutional arrangements needed to
address coordination problems in common-pool resources among potential competitive players in
developing countries. Other authors argue that institutions are created to reduce participants'
transaction costs in making deals or undertaking activities (Coase 1937; Buchanan and Tullock 1965;
Moe 1984; Williamson 1985).
Within this context, institutional change mainly occurs as a result of the entrepreneur's comparisons
of the gains from the existing framework with the gains from trying to alter that framework (March
and Olsen 1995). This happens because, once created, institutions become factors with the potential
of blocking and distorting or resolving “normal” economic processes. Institutions that hinder some,
typically less powerful, individuals or groups may well do so by favoring typically others more
powerful. The reason for this is that the stability of institutions leads to a filtering process of interests
and preferences which mobilize political bias towards some and not others (i.e., institutionalization
with and of bias) (Schattschneider 1960 [1975]). Examples of these inefficient institutions are
revenue extraction, factor price manipulation, and political consolidation (Acemoglu 2005). This
happens even in situations where affected actors voluntarily adhered in the past to now-binding
institutions. If a given institution is subject to a process of competitive selection, it survives primarily
because it provides more benefits to the relevant actors (e.g., lower transaction costs) than
alternate institutional forms (Hall and Taylor 1996).
Kaufman (1985) views randomness rather than rationality as the key factor in institutional survival.
Change, according to Kaufman, comes with time, as the complexity of evolutionary adaptation
increases and leads to structural alterations and the assembly of new alliances. In this sense,
6
statistical probability must be recognized as a contributor to success or failure in institutions. This is
so because, even though decisions may be based on the best information available at any given
moment in time, conditions change, are unpredictable, and responses sometimes lead to different
results from what was expected.
While accepting assumptions of an individual's utility-maximizing behavior, the IRC highlights the
emergence and persistence of institutions in the face of cognitive limits, incomplete information,
and difficulties in monitoring and enforcing agreements (Lowndes 1996). In this sense, IRC avoids
three of the main criticisms Rational Choice Theory faces, in particular those applied to political
sciences (Green and Shapiro 1994). First, IRC does not assume perfect information and individuals
are modeled as bounded rationally. Second, in IRC, preferences are neither complete nor
exogenously determined; they result endogenously as different actors adjust their own
expectations and preferences based on other actors' expectations and preferences, and as actors
interact with the institutional setting. Third, IRC does not focus only on outcomes. In IRC, results are
the corollary of individual or collective bargaining processes assessing pay-offs from different
possible solutions. Green and Shapiro (1994, 6) assert, however, that “in our view, the weaknessesp.
of rational choice scholarship are rooted in the characteristic aspiration of rational choice theorists
to come up with universal theories of politics.”
Breaking Down the Institutional Setting
Having proposed why, how, and in which circumstances a broad institutional setting may affect
behavior, and vice-versa (i.e., they co-evolve), the next goal for this research is to delve in the
identification of more specific contextual factors affecting HSRs, which are used to support the IRC
concept.
In a fast-growing economy, such as the one of Mozambique, where the horizon of production
possibilities has been changing swiftly for the last sixteen years (WB 2007), the possibilities for
further development are viewed more as a function of evolving formal institutions than evolving
informal ones (i.e., there is an urgency to swiftly move from informal to formal forms of organization
of life in society). This research argues that further development will be more likely bounded by
formal than informal institutions (i.e., there is an urgency to identify institutional voids). As such,
three steps are here proposed. First, the general categories of variables important in any
institutional choice setting are derived from the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD)
framework. Second, more specific structuring and contextual elements, and the direction of their
specific effects on HSRs' retention, are derived from two fields of literature: (i) return migration
theories; and (ii) international (Mozambican) development theory. Lastly, within the context of the
international development literature, the extent to which institutions and other factors explored in
previous sections differ from urban to rural settings, and vice-versa, is also discussed.
Institutional Analysis and Development, Contextual Factors, and Action Arenas
IRC tends to stress the formal (as opposed to informal), the dynamic (as opposed to stable and
historical), and the strategic (as opposed to norm-governed behavior) features of institutions and
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individual response. Rivera et al. (2009) are aligned with this conceptualization when arguing that
one of the reasons why institutions exert a “moderation effect” between actors and the
environments in which they operate is that the institutional setting also determines the availability of
resources and how they are exchanged by the different agents involved (also Friedland and Alford
1991).
Ostrom's (1990; 2008) IAD is intended to provide guidance on the variables that may be relevant in
any institutional action arena. As a framework, however, it does not posit theoretical cause-effect
relationships among variables. Instead, the IAD, supported by over 5,000 case studies collected on
common pool resources (CPR) (Fukuyama 2000), is open to working with different theories
illuminating those relationships (e.g., in the case of this research, two other complementarily
theoretical bodies are applied).
The IAD focuses more on the game theory dynamics of multiple principals revolving around a
common institutional problem (Ostrom et al. 1994). There are several seminal works for the
foundations of the IAD. The application of Kenneth Arrow's (1951) Social Choice and Individual
Values to social welfare has generally been accepted as the first of those works. Second, Hardin's
1968 essay on the tragedy of the commons illustrates Aristotle's ( , Book II, ch. 3, 1261b) ideaPolitics p.
that “what is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. Everyone thinks
chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest.” Third, the prisoner's dilemma game (Dawes
1975) where, paradoxically, individual rational strategies lead to collectively irrational outcomes.
Fourth, the logic of collective action (Olson 1965) challenges the presumption that the possibility of a
benefit for a group would be sufficient to generate collective action to achieve that benefit.
To the extent that the HSRs' population is viewed as multiple actors pursuing individual goals within
a common, resources limited, institutional setting, the IAD framework is particularly relevant for
understanding how individual behavior relates to macro structures. The bargaining between
interest parties is, in North's (1994) framework, the central element for the process of institutional
change.
Ostrom starts by defining “action arena” as a multidimensional space where different actors (e.g.,
HSRs) interact around a common situation – the action situation (e.g., Mozambique). Actors,
individuals or groups, are characterized by “(i) the preference evaluations that actors assign to
potential actions and outcomes; (ii) the way actors acquire, process, retain, and use knowledge
contingencies and information; (iii) the selection criteria actors use for deciding upon a particular
course of action; and (iv) the resources that an actor brings to a situation” (Ostrom et al. 1994, 33).p.
An action situation is the “social space where individuals interact, exchange goods and services,
engage in appropriation and provision activities, solve problems, or fight” (ibid., p. 28), and includes
the following elements: “ in who must decide among diverse in light ofparticipants positions actions
the they possess about how actions are to the potential and theinformation linked outcomes costs
and benefits assigned to actions and outcomes” (ibid., p. 29).
If, on one hand, action arenas are the IAD's focal unit of analysis, on the other hand, they are also
viewed as dependent variables influenced by three different clusters of contextual/exogenous/
explanatory factors. Ostrom (2005, 16) argues that “Rules, the biophysical and material world, andp.
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the nature of the community affect the types of actions that individuals can take, theall jointly
benefits and costs of these actions and potential outcomes, and the likely outcomes achieved”
[emphasis added]. Only the cluster “rules”, which also includes personal norms, social norms, and
strategies (Crawford and Ostrom 1995), falls within Ostrom's concept of institutions. Ostrom, then,⁹
conciliates three competing ideas up to this point. If, on one hand, Ostrom attributes primacy to the
role of institutions in development, on the other, she also includes and bridges in her collective
action problems, the macro neo-classic economics' infrastructures (i.e., biophysical and material
conditions) and the micro ethnographic “functionings” (i.e., community attributes). This theoretical
conciliation is not only in terms of a set of different independent variables influencing ajointly
dependent variable. This theoretical conciliation also assumes that the independent variables –
institutions, physical conditions, and community attributes – influence each other as they co-evolve.
The IAD proposes a move from the logic of self-interest-centered approaches to the spirit of
interdependence around those three broad clusters of factors.
It may be claimed that Ostrom's solutions are not governmental solutions, therefore falling outside
of the scope of a research that explicitly debates the role government can play in attracting and
retaining HSRs in its country. Ostrom's framework relies, however, upon the mediating role
government can play either in creating the incentives for different actors to coordinate action (i.e.,
to condition patterns of pay-offs) (e.g., tax deductions for donations to non-governmental
organizations [NGOs]), or in formally institutionalizing more sustainable practices (e.g., fishing
quota for protection of species). Even though there may exist no government ownership in a
particular common situation, the government can still change the underlying conditions around any
given action arena (e.g., by influencing the contextual factors) to shape situations and direct
behavior (Banana and Gombya-Ssembajjwe 2000).
Departing from this strong co-evolutionary dynamic and relationship between institutions (i.e., rules
in place) and other contextual factors (i.e., community attributes and material conditions) the next
three sections are dedicated to identify which specific types of institutional, community, and
biophysical variables mostly affect the possibility of retention of HSRs in Mozambique. While the
IAD, as a framework, points to general types of these variables, theories of international
development and returnees are used to identify the specific variables to be tested. This set of
variables is then used, as independent variables, for the formulation of four testable hypotheses.
The expression “institutional setting” used throughout this research then refers to the landscape of
factors (i.e., institutions plus other contextual elements co-evolving as they interact with each other)
in which HSRs try to mobilize resources over time towards their personal goals.
9
This is why it is inaccurate to identify Ostrom more with formal institutions, as she explicitly talks about diagnosing the
“rules in use” which, even if occasionally equivalent to formal institutions, may also reflect shared strategies and norms
(i.e., informal institutions). In practice, however, Ostrom has tended to measure and study those institutions that are rules
in her definition of institutions, as well as shared strategies, but less so on norms. For a deeper understanding of the
institutional diversity and, in particular, how rules can be further broken down into different sub-categories (i.e., position
rules, boundary rules, choice rules, aggregation rules, information rules, payoff rules, and scope rules) see Ostrom (2005).
9
Return Migration Theories and Community Attributes
Given the high potential value of return migration to the society, many initiatives by national and
international agencies have been directed at attracting their expatriates back – especially the highly
skilled (Ghosh 2000; Lowell 2001; Wickramasekara 2002). Besides policies that encourage the return
of skilled labor, governments can also “fight” the brain drain with retention policies, either through
educational sector policies (e.g., Indian university budget increases) and/or economic development
(e.g., Indian expatriate investment outreach).
Overall, the return migration literature broadly refers to the “Six Rs” (Papademetriou and Martin
1991; Lowell and Findlay 2002) when breaking down the range of possible policies vis-à-vis high
skilled migrants, from a source/sending country point of view: (i) the of migrants to theirreturn
source country; (ii) the of international mobility to nationals and foreign workers; (iii) therestriction
recruitment reparationof international migrants; (iv) the for loss of human capital (compensation);
(v) the expatriates (diaspora options); and (vi) the through educational andresourcing retention
economic sectors' policies (see Table 1 for a comparative analysis of the most relevant international
migration theories).
One way of looking at and comparing these theories is by analyzing how they model the unit of
analysis under consideration – the returnee. While the three first theories – the neoclassic, the new
economic, and the structuralist – view the migratory process as a two-stage single cycle of leave and
return, the remaining two view the migratory process as multi-cycles of leave and return (i.e., brain
circulation).
The first three theories, however, value the decision to return very differently. While for the
neoclassic approach, the return is an anomaly, if not a failure of the migrant experience, since the
successful migrants maximize their experience abroad, for the new economic theory, the return
embodies the successful migrant whose goals abroad were met. For the structuralist approach, the
return is neither a reflex of success nor failure. Typically associated with inactive migrants (e.g., ill,
old, retired) the return is more determined by contextual conditions in the home country (e.g.,
attachment to home or nostalgia) than to a calculated cost/benefit personal analysis. What
distinguishes the transnational and the social network approaches is the degree of migrant
circulation and the role played by networks. While the transnational approach embodies the
successful migrant belonging to a dispersed ethnic group and continuously maintaining across-
boarder mobility, for the social network approach, even though s/he experiences less mobility, the
return is secured and sustained by effective cross-boarder networks of social and economic
relationships.
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In a study about British and Indian highly skilled migrants, Harvey (2009) argues that the availability
of professional opportunities in the home country (i.e., new job offers, or business ventures such as
starting-up companies) is the most important factor for return and retention. Although income was
also an important factor, the nature of their new job or business venture as well as the quality of their
lifestyle was significant in their decision to return to and remain in their home country (Iredale et al.
2003; Saxenian 2006; IOM 2007).
Referring to HSRs, Saxenian (2006, 326) argues that “[t]hey serve as role models, mentors,p.
partners, and investors for entrepreneurs in their home countries … they reject the familial, opaque,
and frequently corrupt business practices that dominate in many developing countries.… Most are
motivated by professional challenges as well as economic opportunity.” According to Saxenian,
HSRs represent and provide an essential mix of local knowledge (i.e., informal institutions) and
global connections to markets and networks (i.e., formal institutions) required for developing
countries to overcome problems of (i) being remote from sources of leading-edge technology; and
(ii) being distant from developed markets and their interactions with users that late-developing
economies typically face.
In spite of several policy initiatives within the African political agenda on migrations and
development (e.g., “Migration and Development for Africa” program [MIDA] by the International
Organization for Migrations [IOM], “Transfer Of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals”
program [TOKTEN] by the United Nations Developed Program [UNDP]), there is still a very limited
understanding of how public policy may affect micro level patterns of migrants' mobility (Dustmann
2003; Cassarino 2004).
In his approach to Italians returning from the U.S. to Southern Italy, Cerase (1974), arguably the most
noted author in this particular issue, classifies them into four categories. The first, “return of
failures”, “for those who spent only one or two years in the U.S., life there was more often than not
miserable: if they held a job at all, it was an unskilled job and one they disliked; rarely had they a
“home”; more often than not they had lived in boarding houses, or even in factory barracks” (ibid., p.
251). “They are, then, the returned migrants who have failed, failed both to get launched in the new
society, and – what is even more significant – to live up to their expectations of the advantages to be
derived from emigration” (ibid., p. 254). The second, “return of conservatism”, refers to “those who
in the new society remained aliens with their minds fixed on their return home, hopefully with
enough money to buy a small piece of land … however minimal they may have been, it required a
certain number of years of hard work in the U.S.” (ibid.). In this category “the immigrant continues to
consider his earnings as well as his investments in terms of the traditional scheme appropriate to his
own country” (ibid., p. 251). Cerase continues, “While in the U.S., they seldom acquired new
occupational skills, and those they did learn were soon forgotten because of their discontinuous
work experience” (ibid., p. 256). The third, “return of retirement”, refers to
those migrants who have returned to retire. America is not a land for old people.
Their health was poor, their social security pension allowed them a more
comfortable living in Italy than in the U.S., and, in addition, they had hardly any family
ties in the U.S.… Retired returnees look upon their return as the beginning of the last
stage of their life.… They have lived a full life in the U.S.… But their sense of
belonging could not go beyond a certain limit ( , 257).Cerase, 1974 p.
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According to Cerase, returnees from these three categories are not active in politics. Those from the
first two categories are similarly apolitical because of their low skills levels, a lack of material
resources, and the absence of social ties. Those from the third category are not engaged largely
because they are too old. The fourth category, however, “return of innovation”, refers to those who
“look upon return as the beginning of a new stage of their life” (ibid.). In this category “the
immigrant sees in his return home a possibility of a greater satisfaction of his needs and aspirations”
(ibid., p. 251). Further “his will, his means, and his belief are new and, strictly speaking, innovative”
(ibid., p. 259). Contrary to other categories, the “return of innovation” aims to disrupt the old
equilibrium in the local power structures. Related with this research, Cerase confesses that “this
research on return migration began with the innovative returnee in mind. The assumption was that
he could have acted as a carrier of social change.… He considers himself an innovator” (ibid., p. 258).
Similarly to what is proposed in this research, Cerase also uses a single nation to formulate his
generalizations. Even though his study was carried out 36 years ago, Cerase's special interest in the
returnees more associated with change and innovation is highly supportive of the focus of this
research on HSRs.
For Cassarino (2004), returnees' entrepreneurial capacity to secure reintegration “at home” lies at
the intersection of patterns of resource mobilization (i.e., material, human, information about
conditions at home, financial), return readiness, motivations, and contextual factors in origin
countries. In this sense, the HSR's capacity to interact with the context in the home country is not
merely the result of their educational levels and/or knowledge acquired. In a broader sense,
retaining HSRs is not only about increasing the educational levels in developing countries. It is also
about “importing” tangible (e.g., savings accumulated abroad) and intangible resources (e.g.,
professional networks) networked around the HSRs.
Overall, the literature and their attendant policies have focused on the economic aspects of the
HSRs' retention process. More specifically, intimately related to the IAD's material conditions,
special emphasis has been paid to resources available to HSRs (e.g., lowering HSRs' transition and
transaction costs) and the rule of law (e.g., job/professional/entrepreneurship-related programs).
Fukuyama (1992) argued that what drives men and women is the attainment of personal recognition
based on a deep sense of self-worth. If this is so, not only does it help to explain why so many¹⁰
Africans decide to return to communities deprived of material conditions, but it also shows that
material-based explanations are insufficient to explain those decisions (e.g., the role of family,
community, culture). Fukuyama states: “as populations become better educated people begin to
demand not simply more wealth but recognition of their status” (p. vxiii).
10
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13
METHODOLOGY
Tools and Samples
A data-base of highly skilled migrants (HSMs) was developed for more than two years and now with
1,415 contacts it is the largest resource available listing Mozambicans with international academic
and professional experience. Even though the majority of these individuals has not yet returned to
Mozambique, all were targeted by this research. Of these, 217 – the study extended sample of HSMs
– answered the survey, of which 100 had already returned – the study sample of HSRs. Even though
this research focuses on those HSMs who have already returned (i.e., the HSRs) , data from those¹¹
who have not yet done so was also gathered and analyzed to get a broader sense, for instance, of the
reasons for leaving Mozambique, destinations chosen, degrees, skills, and training obtained,
expectations about the future, perceptions of Mozambique while abroad, and satisfaction abroad.
Figure 1: Social Connectivity in Sample Construction
Figure 1 represents the social relationships between entities that directly contributed to the
construction of the sample (labeled nodes) and HSMs that participated in this study (non-labeled¹²
nodes), either as sample members and/or as providers of HSMs' contacts. In total, there were 278
actors (i.e., nodes) involved, entities and individuals combined, establishing between them 316 ties
(i.e., names' nominations).
The survey tool was designed in the Portuguese language, disseminated using the web tool “Survey
Monkey” and was on-line during the period of field research in Mozambique - between November 17,
2009, and January 11, 2010. Figure 2 illustrates when and where the ethnographic experience
occurred during the field research. A final visit occurred in July 2010 for presentation and discussion
of results with a sub-group of 17 HSRs.
11
HSMs = HSRs + HS not-yet-Returned.
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Even though, several other organizations not mentioned here also collaborated, in many cases contacts provided or
mediated did not generate new sample members.
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Source: Author’s own contruction
where,
k = 1, …, 6: different regression models considered.
y: retention of HSRs.
n = 1, …, N: sample size (100).
β = 0, …, 4: regression parameters/coefficients.
vector of professional-related variables [H ].₁
vector of ICTs-related variables [H ].₂
vector of governmental programs-related variables [H ].₃
vector of controlling variables.
Week 5
Weeks 1 to 3 and 7
Week 6
Week 4
450 miles: 12hrs train ride x 2
700 miles: 36hrs 30T sugar truck ride
560 miles: 22hrs bus ride
Figure 2: Map of Field Research
Source: Google Maps
Note: The return from Nampula to Maputo after the 6 week was done in a 2hrs ﬂight.th
Variables and Model Building
Overall, the multivariate analysis was used to explore variations of the baseline model of the type:
x 1:
x2:
x3:
x4:
ε :     residual error term for y .n n
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This research considers two different types of independent variables (IVs): (i) socio-demographics
(control variables); and (ii) contextual factors (testing IVs). Socio-demographics, such as gender,
age, religion, ethnicity, marital status, number of dependents, education level, political affiliation,
geographic location of birth and current residence, life experience abroad, year of return, and
reasons to leave and return to Mozambique, were selected based on a large survey developed and
applied by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, on
return migration to Maghreb countries (MiReM 2007).
13
Data, primarily quantitative, on contextual factors seek to capture (i) HSRs' access to and use of
more specific contextual variables/elements; and (ii) the assessment of HSRs' experience with these
variables/elements. The expected direction of association between dependent and independent
variables is of the type “the more HSRs access and use the contextual factor or element considered,
the higher is the likelihood of remaining in Mozambique.” The three contextual factors considered
are professional opportunities, ICTs, and governmental programs. Tables 2 to 4 illustrate how survey
questions relate to contextual factors, variables and hypotheses, and how these relate to
Institutional Rational Choice (IRC) testing.
1 3
Recent past:
Satisfaction
with the
circumstances
of the return.
Future:
Probability of
emigrating
again.
Present:
Current
personal
satisfaction in
Mozambique.
Distant past:
Expectations to
return to
Mozambique at
the time of
emigrating.
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Figure 3: HSRs' Migratory Cycle's Time Line
The several approaches formulated for the dependent variables can be represented in a time
line associated with the HSRs' migratory cycle (see Figure 3).
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Source: Author’s own contruction
13
Complete description of this field survey at http://www.mirem.eu. Survey tool applied and results at
http://www.mirem.eu/datasets/survey/survey?set_language=en.
t0
Table 2: Hypothesis 1 (H )1
Increased access to professional opportunities favors retention of HSRs.
Table 3 Hypothesis 2 (H ): 2
Increased access to ICTs favors retention of HSRs.
# Contextual Variables Information for Public Policy
Contextual Factor: Material Conditions / Example:ICTs
1 Current use Technological penetration/culture
2 Potential use Potential for technological penetration
3 Factors preventing use Institutional opportunities/constraints
(e.g., priorities)
4 Potential access Potential for technological dissemination
and for new/expanding markets
5 Factors preventing access Institutional opportunities/constraints
(e.g., priorities)
# Contextual Variables Information for Public Policy
Contextual factor: Community Attributes / Example: Professional Opportunities
1 Current professional situation Rate of profession integration,
unemployment rate, entrepreneurship
rate
2 Duration of the situation Temporal reference
3 Personal aspirations Professional mobility, labor supply,
human dynamics
4 Professional aspirations Job market (e.g., jobs demand,
professional mobility, opportunities)
5 Factors hindering professional
expectations
Institutional opportunities/constraints
(e.g., priorities)
6 Current employment situation Industrial and regional dynamics
7 Entrepreneurship Social and economic dynamics/trends,
market forces
8 Factors constraining entrepreneurship Institutional opportunities/constraints
(e.g., priorities)
9 Entrepreneurship aspirations Trust, economic conﬁdence, social
attitude
10 Factors constraining
Entrepreneurship aspirations
Institutional opportunities/constraints
(e.g., priorities)
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# Contextual Variables Information for Public Policy
Contextual Factor: Rules in Place / Example: Governmental Programs
1 Information about conditions in
Mozambique
Institutional opportunities/constraints
(e.g., communication channels, diasporas
involvement)
2 Information about
programs/initiatives
Attraction, return, and retention of highly
skilled citizens
3 Access to speciﬁc programs/initiatives Institutional opportunities/constraints
(e.g., priorities, government image,
international networks, internet)
4 Sources of information Governance, priorities, partnerships,
innovation
5 Beneﬁt from programs/initiatives Attraction, return, and retention of highly
skilled citizens
6 Beneﬁt from speciﬁc
programs/initiatives
Institutional opportunities/constraints
(e.g., government priorities, bureaucracy,
housing)
Table 4: Hypothesis 3 (H )3
Increased access to governmental programs favors retention of HSRs.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
By assuming that the ultimate explanatory variable of development, thus of the alleviation of
suffering, is the educational level of communities and nations (Fukuyama 1992; Huntington 1993),
the contribution of this research is materialized on a policy-making tool addressing (i) the role
Mozambican highly skilled returnees (HSRs) can play for the development of the country, and (ii) the
constraints they face in the processes of their reintegration in the home country. This contribution
was prepared with three different types of audiences in mind. First, the Mozambican government
who could design better policies to attract and retain a larger number of its well-educated citizens.
Second, the civil society and private sector that search of highly qualified and highly motivated
professionals for their organizations. Third, the international organizations and donors committed
to a post-2015 Millennium Development Goals' (MDG) renewed plan.
This research used Institutional Rational Choice (IRC) to frame the first goal described above and to
understand how Mozambican HSRs, in pursuit of their personal aspirations and goals, are affected
by the institutional setting in their home country. To test IRC, the research question “What factors
affect retention of HSRs in Mozambique?” was formulated. As the theory suggests, institutions and
other contextual factors are of very different types and may affect behavior in a myriad of ways. New
institutional perspectives on development and return migration theories served as the basis for
selecting the contextual factors for the hypotheses-testing of this research. These hypotheses
served as bridges between theory and policy. Three types of factors/elements were selected:
professional opportunities, information and communication technologies (ICTs), and governmental
programs. Each corresponded to a given hypothesis formulated to address the research question. A
fourth hypothesis was considered to study the extent to which the three types of factors tested
differ in their effects from urban to rural settings. A better understanding of the constraints imposed
by contextual factors on HSRs' behavior and personal satisfaction could allow governments in
extremely poor countries to prioritize interventions for institutional development, given the very
scarce resources available. These could have the interaction effect of increasing the capacity of
HSRs to contribute to the development of Mozambique and provide positive signals to encourage
the return of more. This second goal was explored with the scientific community in mind. By building
on existing theory and knowledge of the problem of persistent extreme poverty, this research aims
at providing some answers but also at suggesting new questions for further research.
Why a study on HSRs and retention within the development field? If HSRs represent a variation (i.e.,
flux) of highly qualified human capital in Mozambique, which is a key variable for development,
retention can be viewed as the stock of this variable needed to induce development.
Thus, while the identification and listing of contextual factors, and corresponding elements,
affecting retention (i.e., behavior) was part of the task required to answer this research question,
the determination of their relative importance was a much more useful and critical exercise. This is so
because to be a useful policy-making tool this research should be able to guide the definition and
prioritization of policies that could favor the retention of highly skilled Mozambicans (HSMs) in
Mozambique. Consequently, this chapter is dedicated (i) to present the major findings of this
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research; (ii) to discuss the major theoretical implications arising from those findings; (iii) to highlight
political and practical implications towards HSMs' retention; (iv) to suggest future research; and (v)
to offer both a brief summary of the entire research project and some thoughts on the possibility of a
future global partnership for highly skilled migrants.
Major Findings
The major findings of this research result from hypotheses-testing. First, this research demonstrated
that all three contextual factors tested are associated with retention of the highly-skilled
Mozambicans. This finding supports the I A D's argument that knowing about the
biophysical/material and community variables is still “policy relevant”, given that new policies and
institutions can be devised to shape those other contextual variables. Second, this research showed
that the degree of association between contextual factors and retention differs across factors (i.e.,
the differentiated value of factors). Third, this research also showed that the degree of association
also differs from urban to rural settings. Fourth, this research demonstrated that the primordial role
played by professional-related elements in the capacity of a country to retain some of its most well-
educated citizens supports previous literature reviewed. Fifth, this research clarified that the
possibility of achieving personal goals is the most important component of one's overall life
satisfaction, and thus retention. Implications resulting from these findings can be classified into
three categories: (i) theoretical; (ii) practical for policy; and (iii) and for future research.
Theoretical Implications
The first major theoretical implication is that the combination of IRC and the Institutional Analysis
and Development (IAD) proved to be a very valid theoretical framework to understand the problem
of brain-drain and the possibility of its inversion (i.e., attraction and retention of HSMs). On one
hand, this research demonstrated that institutions and other contextual factors do impose
constraints on HSRs' outcomes and behavior (i.e., retention) (Arrow 1951; Olsen 1965; Buchanan and
Tullock 1965; Tullock 2008). On the other hand, this research showed that institutions operating
within a given action arena should be classified into different categories (Ostrom et al. 1994; Ostrom
1990; 2005; 2008), with each exerting different effects (Rivera et al. 2009) on HSRs. Consequently,
but more interestingly and more specifically, this research constitutes a significant contribution for
several other major current intellectual debates related to development and emerging economies.
First, this research suggests, though not intended to explicitly tested it, that institutional elements,
such as the rule of law, corruption, political stability, and functioning of the public administration are
more significant for the decision to return than macro economic variables, such as the gross
domestic product (GDP) or the human development index (HDI). In this sense, this research
supports the argument that institutional development precedes economic development (Rodrik
2002; Barro 2003; Rodrik and Wacziarg 2005). While the contribution for the economic development
of Mozambique is the main goal for the return, the return itself depends less on economic factors
than on institutional quality (North 1994; North et al. 2003; Birdsall et al. 2005). Because this is so, this
research also demonstrated, through the lens of the HSRs, that micro-level programs, at the
individuals' incentives level, are very useful to foster retention and development (Dustmann 2003;
Cassarino 2004). The direct corollary of this argument is that contextualized bottom-up approaches,
HSRs-targeted, to policy-making, would be very useful for the development of Mozambique
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(Lindblom 1959 McMillan 2004 Easterly 2006a). Actually, these HSRs-targeted policies may very; ;
well be what Sen (1981) calls the “functionings” allowing individuals to act out of personal choice.
Additionally, the resilient nature of some inefficient institutions (e.g., corruption, political
interference, and bureaucracy) may be explained either by (i) Kaufman's (1985) randomness
associated with the idea that structural alterations need time to occur as the complexity of
evolutionary adaptation increases; by (ii) Tullock's (2008) idea of public choice through which the
rational political actor protects his/her own political interest; or by (iii) Acemoglu et al.'s (2002)
historically-determined component of colonial and civil war institutions and volatility.
The second major theoretical finding, partly related to the first, is that the low economic
development of a nation does not necessarily result in experiencing detrimental brain drain. This
means that only when the threshold of social return to migrants' education exceeding their private
returns is achieved should brain drain be viewed as detrimental for the development of a country
(i.e., it is not because a relatively small number of highly skilled citizens do not return that brain drain
is detrimental for development) (Beine et al. 2001). In the case of Mozambique, several indicators
point to the surprising finding that, contrary to other countries (Todaro 1985), brain drain may not
even be a problem after all. Thousands of highly skilled Mozambicans left the country at the time of
independence in 1974, to avoid political uncertainty, the newly established communist regime, or a
civil war that lasted for twenty years. The “simple” prospect of a better professional life abroad (e.g.,
Portugal, South Africa, Zimbabwe) was also a major factor for the exodus at that time. Even if until
the end of the 20 century brain drain was, eventually, very substantial, that should not be the
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standard to measure current brain drain, and that should not be the standard to assess the impact of
brain drain in current development. The question of how many highly skilled personnel are abroad
without setting a time range is inaccurate for the purpose of assessing the impact of brain drain in
current development. The question should be: “How long have they been abroad?” According to
three HSRs interviewed, which referred to all other HSMs they knew, nine in every ten HSMs had
returned. According to the quantitative data collected, current brain drain is at most 31 percent (i.e.,
69 percent returned already). Actual brain drain, although not the primary subject of this research,
might be lower than this because many of those who have not yet returned are still in the process of
concluding their degrees/training and it is expected that some or many of them will end up returning.
Thus, it is important to clearly distinguish the brain drain stock from its variations (i.e., fluxes). The
stock results from summing up all highly-skilled citizens who left their home country at some point.
While the quantification of this brain drain stock may have some relevance from a historical and
demographic perspective, both for the countries of origin and destination, it is significant neither to
assess current brain drain variations nor to assess its impact on development. World Bank (WB) data,
the only data of this kind available, used to formulate the problem of this research is of this type
(Docquier and Marfouk 2004). The problem with this type of data is not only that it fails to consider
recent trends in brain drain fluxes but also neglects major contextual changes and developments
(e.g., the end of the Mozambican civil war in 1994). For the case of Mozambique, the current brain
drain stock, inherited from decades ago, does not reflect current conditions in the nation.
The other component of brain drain results from considering actual brain drain only as recent fluxes
of human capital (e.g., last ten years). The advantage of this type of data for countries, like
Mozambique, which has recently come out from very unstable conditions (e.g., wars, revolutions,
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ethnic conflicts), is that it makes a much more direct connection between current HSRs' behavior
and the current institutional setting. These data were not found but will be invaluable for future
research.
Regardless of the time frame chosen to define the boundaries for the fluxes, a certain initial number
of years should not be counted either. For instance, a student that spends three to five years abroad
to finish a degree (HSRs on average expect to remain four years abroad) should not be considered
detrimental (i.e., irreversible, structural, long-term) brain drain, since s/he is still in her/his “normal”
training period, after which will eventually benefit the home country. Within this context, a
detrimental brain drain should not be a function of the brain drain stock, but of the percentage of
HSMs that did not return, for instance, between the fifth and tenth years abroad.
There is some evidence that points to the fact that, in spite of the very low economic level, partly due
to historical events, the most skilled and brightest Mozambicans are returning. Once again, the first
theoretical implication discussed above is reinforced: institutional development precedes economic
development (Rodrik 2002; Barro 2003; Rodrik and Wacziarg 2005). In summary, contrary to what
the WB argues (Docquier and Marfouk 2004), this research did not find empirical support for the
hypothesis that “Mozambique has been facing increasing levels of the brain drain”. This research
suggests the opposite. In fact, the overall improvement of the institutional setting may be the
explanation for the brain drain inversion that Mozambique has been experiencing in the last ten or
fifteen years. The actual “improvement” may, however, be illusory. HSMs returned to Mozambique,
and now embedded within previously found (i.e., while abroad) institutional inefficiencies (e.g.,
power centralization, political preferences, trade barriers), may now simply perceive them as less
discouraging.
Thirdly, while results from this research support studies in other countries in which professional-
related factors play a fundamental role in the return and retention process (Iredale and Guo 2001;
Black et al. 2003; Birdsall et al. 2005; Saxenian 2006; Harvey 2009), for the case of Mozambique, the
role family-related factors play is ambiguous. As happens with professional-related elements, family
definitely plays a key role in the return and retention decision, but it is not clear whether as a positive
incentive to return (i.e., affective reasons) or as a negative incentive (i.e., an obstacle) to remain
abroad (i.e., material reasons, such as, providing for the family). Birdsall et al. (2005) suggest that the
more qualified one is, the more his/her focus shifts from family to public life. Nevertheless, the
combination of both professional and family-related factors may be the reason why, as discussed
above, Mozambique has not been facing “increasing levels of the brain drain”.
Fourth, even though it is not directly related to this hypotheses-testing, this research suggests that
there is a social constructed reciprocity between social and scientific development (i.e., mutually
complementary) that is not found between economic and social development. This means that the
majority of those who chose social development (scientific development) as the main personal goal
upon returning chose scientific development (social development) as their second most important
goal. This reciprocity was not found between economic and social development since the majority of
those who chose social development as their most important goal did not chose economic
development as their second goal. Even though the literature reviewed for this research does not
clarify the reasons for this finding, nor exactly what it means (again, this was not even the purpose of
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this research), a few tentative explanations may be proposed. First, economics and science seem to
be means (i.e., tools) to a higher end, social development. Second, for those giving priority to social
development, this goal is more of a function of science than economics. The rationale for this may be
related to the nature of some of the most critical Mozambican problems: health (e.g., AIDS, malaria),
education (38.7 percent of adult [>15 years of age] literacy rate against the 59.3 percent in Sub-
Saharan Africa), and food (e.g., low productivity crops, high weather uncertainty). These critical
issues draw more attention to and expectations for scientific solutions to solve basic and immediate
human needs, than on higher income levels for future material possessions. Another explanation
may be found in some sample bias towards academic/scientific activities given HSRs embeddedness
in academic/scientific contexts abroad. One way or another, scientific development is valued so
highly by HSRs surveyed that one in every five HSRs wants a job on Education/Research field – the
highest rated field. If, on one hand, this may be an opportunity for Mozambique, on the other, it may
hinder retention if consonant professional opportunities are not both offered and found (Iredale et
al. 2003; IOM 2007).
Fifth, this research demonstrated that HSMs' return process is characterized by aspects depicted
from different theories of return migration. Far from the neoclassic economics approach, which sees
return as an anomaly, if not a failure, HSMs' return combines the new economics of labor migration's
calculated strategy (i.e., migration project), once goals are met abroad, with the structuralism's
readjustment of motivations to institutional realities and power relations in the home country.
HSMs' return is also described by some aspects of transnationalism and cross-border social
networks. Return and retention are not necessarily permanent. The constant tension between
family ties, the perception of reasonable socio-economic conditions in the home country, and the
possibility of a new opportunity abroad, lead HSRs to develop and maintain socio- and professional
international ties. Complementarily, improved skills and educational background gained abroad
allow upward mobility, and the possible recognition of these by fellow Mozambicans is a
contributory factor for securing return. Summarizing, this theoretical hybrid suggests that
Mozambican HSRs' behaviors and interests are constrained by structural aspects of their home
country (Cassarino 2004; Harvey 2009) and induced by cross-border networks (Saxenian 2006;
Riddle and Nielsen 2008).
Sixth, all the theories of return migration analyzed seem to impose the need of some type of
structural framework (e.g., family, networks) to explain return and retention (Xiang 2000; Cassarino
2004). Even though all these aspects were found to be very relevant for the Mozambican HSRs, none
of these theories explicitly accepts the possibility of a decision based on one's subjective assessment
of his/her happiness regardless of structural conditions, providing that some minimum conditions
are met (e.g., the end of the civil war, the establishment of minimum democratic conditions). In this
sense, retention would be more a function of individual motivation for accomplishing personal goals
than of conditions offered by the outside context (Diener 1984; Fukuyama 1992). This personal
motivation does not imply an atomistic realization, as if individuals operated in complete isolation,
since it is also influenced by one's recognition in the community. It is true that perceptions about the
possibility of fulfilling personal goals may be influenced by indigenous structural aspects (e.g.,
family, social ethics, rule of law), and the return moment determined by them. However, for the
HSRs studied, once they return retention itself seems more a function of one's perception of his/her
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empowerment to induce change (i.e., happiness, life satisfaction), partly as a result of the
knowledge and skills obtained abroad, than to external conditions (Veenhoven 2001).
Seventh, the “Maputo effect”, which this research identified, supports the idea that institutions and
other contextual factors play a fundamentally different role depending on the location (i.e., urban or
rural) of their jurisdiction (Lipton 1977; Bates 1993; Mamdani 1996; Boone 2003). This finding is
particularly relevant for the case of Mozambique given its very high internal inequalities. The risk of
ethnic divisions and conflicts associated with perceptions of discrimination in access to and benefit
of certain resources may threat the integrity of the development process of Mozambique. To make
the construction of the Mozambican nation viable, the government is called upon to design and
implement unifying institutions capable of equally distributing resources and legitimizing power
jurisdictions (Cahen 1994; Cabaço 1995; Macuene 2001).
Policy Recommendations
Constructing a decision-making tool for policy was one of the explicit goals formulated for this
research. Thus, fifteen recommendations can be drawn from previous analysis and discussions, in
particular from the results of hypotheses-testing.
ProfessionalOpportunities-related
Employment-related
Donors and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are the main education grant
providers in Mozambique. They should consider orienting their financial support to Mozambicans
willing to study in areas that are a national priority. These would have to be defined by national and
provincial authorities interacting with corporations and business associations. These scholarships
could have the promise of a challenging employment upon concluding studies/training and
returning attached to them. This research raises the question, however, of whether the overseas
training programs are meeting the needs of the domestic economy. This hypothesis is suggested
because of the difficulties HSRs face to find a job in spite of the widespread need of qualified
personnel across the country.
Due to HSMs' propensity for political affiliation abroad, plus the role embassies and consulates can
play in aggregating diasporas, it would also be possible for the government to have an updated
database of some of its most well-educated citizens living abroad. This database could then be used
for general information about conditions in the home country and to disseminate information about
specific programs (e.g., participation of the diaspora in elections, returning support programs, jobs
available, HSMs' profiles available, culture). Designed for online use, this new platform would allow
HSMs to register by a procedure similar to the one developed to build this study sample. More than a
list of registered HSMs, this new platform should be interactive enough (e.g., integration with
YouTube for candidates' video presentations, facebook profiles) to have the diaspora engaged, for
instance, in supporting local NGOs, networking for business, offering gifts and transferring
remittances online, among others (the role the Mozambican diaspora has been playing was very
negatively rated). Other sources of information for this database could be the list of registrations for
visas, or requests for information to the government or international donors (i.e., information from
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HSMs can be obtained at different levels of their interaction with the government and other
organizations). This database and online tool should have enough information about Mozambique
and about HSMs to increase the likelihood of a match between national needs (i.e., professional
opportunities, geographic focus) and HSMs' aspirations (i.e., personal goals, interests, areas of
education and training). For instance, initiatives for recruitment abroad were pointed out by HSMs
as very important for their return.
Entrepreneurship-related
Since 90 percent of the HSRs want to have his/her own business, and friends and professional
networks are listed as the main sources of new business ideas, the government should encourage,
maybe even sponsor, events connecting HSRs with each other, with the private sector, and civil
society. Lack of or difficulties in accessing capital are the main reasons not to open a business.
Actually this has been a major critical factor for private sector development in Mozambique.
According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2008, 8), in the traditional Mozambicanp.
financial system “credit spreads and bank fees are abnormally high ... fee income accounted for 43
percent of the income of the banks in 2005 and 2006… The rates are only bearable for short-term,
high margin trade operations – not for agriculture or industry.” Paradoxically, these are the main
economic activities in Mozambique. With interest rates fluctuating between 18 to 25 percent, plus
the additional commissions and cost associated with the need of real guarantees, most of the small
and medium scale enterprises (SMEs), who cannot afford these costs, are forced to limit investment
to their own capital (Borgarello et al. 2004).
Current initiatives from the government and major international organizations (e.g., WB,
International Finance Corporation [IFC], United Nations Development Program [UNDP]), such as
incubators, seed capital, and venture capital should be disseminated and promoted to HSMs, which
could have the double effect of increasing the probability of attracting and retaining them as well as
inducing private sector development. Moreover, since one's recognition, mainly for those owing a
personal business, by his/her community is strongly associated with professional-related elements
very selective and local interventions, driven by an adequate ethnographic interpretation, and
favoring entrepreneurship and empowering entrepreneurs, either carried out by governmental or
non-governmental organizations, could have an additional positive effect on the strengthening and
connectedness of institutional support networks for HSRs. Access to capital and opportunities to
open a business could, partly, off set, the international vs. domestic wage differential discouraging
return. Training programs should also be considered given that ten percent of the HSMs points to
his/her own lack of initiative, risk aversion, and lack of experience the main reasons not to start a
business.
It is important to point, however, that HSMs are very suspicious of government involvement. For 17
percent of the HSMs surveyed, governmental bureaucracy (e.g., average time of payment for
services) and political preferences constituted major barriers to entrepreneurial activities. In this
sense, the HSMs database could also be used for marketing a modernized and more efficient
government (this overall positive improvement is actually what HSMs' perceptions reveal).
Finally, for private sector development, these findings highly recommend that the government
revises its procedures for circulation of goods and services (e.g., complex and expensive imports
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Additionally, the Eastern Africa Submarine Cable System (EASSy) (see Figure 4), currently being
developed, together with the Seacon fiber optic cable in operations since June 2009, could allow
prices for Mozambique's international connectivity to drop between five to ten times if cost
projections are realized (Muchanga 2008).
The combination of these two technological developments – EASSy and Seacon – together with the
political decision to split TDM would be a major achievement for further widespread access and use
of ICTs in Mozambique. Moreover, the results from this research can be used as a reference point for
further reflection on what satisfies HSRs with ICTs, and what constitutes barriers for their patterns
of reintegration. Recommendations related to structural regional asymmetries are explored next
when addressing the urban vs. rural dichotomy.
Figure 4: Eastern Africa Submarine Cable System (EASSy)
Source: Muchanga (2008)
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system), simplify its fiscal and taxing system, and make current complex labor and hiring regulations
more flexible; all of which were noted to be major threats to business's achievements. For this to
occur, purposely designed institutional inefficiencies, to protect some political interests, have to be
corrected so as not to interfere with market rules.
ICT-related
While, on one hand, access to technology (e.g., computers, cellular phones) is being facilitated given
that many packages offered by operators include free, or inexpensive devices, on the other, prices
charged for the correspondent services are very high. Furthermore, many times, the quality was
thought to be questionable by those surveyed. This research reinforces what the WB has been
encouraging the government to do: to split “Telecomunicações de Moçambique” (TDM) into
telecommunications backbone ownership and a service provider. Every service provider should
compete for a market share under the same conditions. Currently, the TDM-service provider does
not have to pay the price other operators have to pay to access the TDM-backbone.
GovernmentalPrograms-related
It could give the impression that by studying the role institutions play in influencing and constraining
HSRs' behavior, this research was embracing DiMaggio and Powell's (1991) perspective of more
autonomous (i.e., resilient) institutions. As discussed in the literature review, this is not the case. This
research investigates the effect of institutions on HSRs precisely because it assumes that by
understanding HSRs' attitude towards the institutional setting (i.e., the demand side), it may
provide valuable signals for institutional change through government intervention (i.e., supply side).
Several professional opportunities-related governmental initiatives have already been suggested.
With the goal of increasing the probability of attracting HSMs and retaining HSRs, government-led
programs can include other areas of the institutional setting. In general terms, many initiatives have
been suggested throughout this research. They lean more towards micro-level, bottom-up, type of
interventions than on massive pushes. For instance, for firms, the government could introduce tax
incentives for hiring abroad. For major NGOs and cooperating organizations, the government could
create incentives for hiring HSMs as consultants, experts, technicians, so as not to rely so much on
expatriates. This expatriate labor force not only charges higher salaries but also does not expend the
money in Mozambique (Personal interview, January 2010). For Mozambican families and individuals
in general, the government should continue its efforts towards modernization, decentralization,
and transparency, since, in spite of the overall improvements, corruption, political interference, and
bureaucracy are still major problems for the HSRs surveyed. Other initiatives highly rated by HSMs
are housing programs, and support for technological and scientific activities.
In designing the post-2015 version of the MDGs, the Mozambican government and the UNDP should
work together to include return programs for HSMs in their policies and initiatives. The International
Organization for Migrations' (IOM) previous experience with the Migration and Development for
Africa (MIDA) program could be a reference for an enhanced initiative.
As already introduced above, and to summarize the role government can have, this research showed
that one is not just getting policy insights from the “institutional” category of variables/elements. All
categories of variables considered offer policy insights for the design of new rules that will ultimately
change those contextual factors and make the overall institutional setting more favorable for HSRs.
Urbanvs.Rural -related
To say that Mozambique faces very severe regional asymmetries and because of that a stronger
emphasis on regional development and budgetary decentralization should be considered is
redundant when talking about one of the poorest countries in the world. Besides being redundant,
there are already major policies in place in areas such as energy, education, and health. What this
research can conclude more specifically is that HSMs in general, and HSRs in particular, are willing to
move away from the capital city of Maputo and to embrace professional activities other than those
for which they were trained. This propensity for mobility could encourage the government to
increase the salary bonus for accepting jobs outside Maputo, since the current bonus of five percent
has not proven sufficient. Locations such as Nampula, Tete, Manica, Quelimane are very highly rated
in HSRs preferences. In more general terms, all policy recommendations suggested for professional
opportunities and ICTs should factor this Maputo-bias in ways to mitigate the already prevailing
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inequalities. Availability of information is crucial and firms or civil society could embrace this task of
connecting HSRs with regional needs if the government cannot or will not.
Future Research
In the light of the extant research, what more may be learned from further research on HSRs,
institutions, and other contextual variables? What are the suggestions for the next generation of
researchers? There are eight research avenues that derive naturally from this research. First, a
parallel study could be conducted in other sub-Saharan Africa countries to assess both the extent to
which contextual factors play similar (or dissimilar) roles on retention, and whether the results found
are specific or not for Mozambique, namely in terms of the current high rate of return. Second, the
same study, including the same sample, could be carried out within two or three years to factor in
longitudinal aspects of HSRs' patterns of reintegration. Aspects to be covered should include
institutional change (i.e., how did HSRs' perceptions of the institutional quality evolved?), dynamics
in terms of individual's life satisfaction (i.e. happier or unhappier with life in Mozambique after
returning), and, finally, to assess whether HSMs actually remained in the country or not. Conclusions
about this last aspect would allow validating the usefulness of the proxies for retention used in this
research.
Third, future research could delve further into the institutional diversity proposed by the IAD to
study which sub-categories of rules better explain the results discussed throughout this research.
Central for the theory building of this research is the idea of collective actions towards some type of
common interests eventually leading to institutional changes. In this sense, the social connectivity
illustrated in Figure 5 (i.e., the network of relationships between HSMs that allowed building this
study sample) can be viewed as the baseline of a social process either evolving towards a more
cohesive or a more dispersed collective. Future research will deal with this question and its
implications, in particular with the dynamics of ties within this community, and who, if empowered,
could more likely lead change. For instance, as revealed by this study sample, the most important
sources for business ideas are networking and contacts among friends.
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Figure 5: HSMs' Social Connectivity
Source: Author’s own construction
Agents' interactions can be modeled by networks evolving over time, with their evolutionary
process of differentiation, selection, and amplification providing the system with novelty
responsible for the growth in order and complexity. The focus will then be on the emergence of
system regularities from local interactions between agents (i.e., system's evolution). Fifth, the study
of this structural dynamics could be very useful to understanding how the demand side of
institutional change behaves, and how it pressures the supply side for change. As suggested before,
once rules of interaction are discovered, models can be constructed that will help us understand and
predict political behavior (Moe 1984; Williamson 1985; Ostrom 2008).
Merging the fields of happiness studies with institutions and public policy proved very useful. Sixth,
following Veenhoven's (2004; 2007) claims that governments should take happiness as an aim in
public policy, research could also be carried across countries in order to create an index of HSRs
happiness. This index would be calculated in the same terms that it was calculated in this research:
the difference between Fukuyama's (1992) four items on the scale – those related with one's
recognition by his/her community – and Diener's (1984) five items on the scale – those related to
subjective assessment of one's well-being.
One of the aspects that this research was not able to address (neither was it the purpose of this
research design) is the clarification of what constitute an “institution”. Seventh, ifdoes not
institutions affect behavior, and if institutions differ in their capacity to affect behavior, as this
research demonstrated, is there any threshold-level bellow which the value (i.e., capacity to affect
behavior) of an “institution” is so low that should not be called institution? Which aspects of life are
not institutions? What then are the conceptual and the material boundaries for the definition of
“institution”?
One of the goals of the field research was to study aspects of extreme poverty in Mozambique.
Surprisingly, however, only widespread very low material levels were found during the ethnographic
experience in the field. These very low material levels translate, most likely, into a living standard of
less than US$1 per day (purchas power parity [PPP]). In this sense, they indeed reflect extremeing
poverty as defined by the WB. Nevertheless, the use of expressions such as “extreme poverty” has a
much stronger connotation, namely related to human misery, starvation, and social anarchy. Even
though these are the types of expressions that Western donors and international organizations use
to create a sense of urgency towards intervention, they do not reflect the much more positive reality
that both qualitative (e.g., research observations in the field across around two thousand miles) and
quantitative (e.g., HSRs' perceptions of conditions in the home country as discussed throughout this
research) data collected in Mozambique suggest. These organizations aim at reaching the goodwill
of sponsors, tax payers, and other contributors to obtain financing for operations as well as for their
own organizational existence. This research argues, however, that international cooperation lacks a
deeper ethnographic interpretation of both indigenous conditions and their meaning for the human
landscape and the well-being of the people.
Eighth, it would be interesting to investigate the mediating role these organizations (i.e., also a type
of institution) play in mediating between reality in Africa, or in Mozambique in particular, and
perceptions of that reality in the developed world. To what extent is this sense of (development)
urgency, promoted by the international civil society, threateningly pressuring legitimate fragilebut
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governments? What motivates this sense of urgency? Could HSRs, empowered by their multicultural
experience on both ends of the development ladder (i.e., developed and developing), play a role in
smoothing this hypothesized asymmetry between indigenous reality and foreign perception of that
reality?
Closing Notes
This research demonstrated that institutions do not operate isolated from other contextual factors
for the political, economic and social development of an African state. But this research also
demonstrated that (i) new policies and institutions can shape those other contextual variables if (ii)
governments are informed of how interdependent variables are and if, , (iii) theyaccordingly
prioritize interventions for institutional development given the very scarce resources available.
More specifically, this research suggests that by promoting the retention, and also the return, of
highly skilled citizens African countries can experience substantial growth in the stock of the
education level of their populations in a much shorter time than if relying exclusively on the
prospective of a better educated future generation.
While the focus of this research was on the relationship between individual behavior and contextual
conditions in Mozambique, this research also suggests that in an era of “brain circulation”
institutional design directed towards the highly skilled has a better chance of achieving its goals if
conceived within a global partnership framework. Governments in host countries could alleviate
nationalist and/or protectionist pressures related to the labor market and unemployment rates;
even among highly skilled labor. Businesses in host countries considering exporting, opening offices
abroad, or relocating their production infrastructure could, alternatively, more intensively hire
highly skilled Africans. These have a very unique skill: the know-how both on modern business
practices and ethics, and on the indigenous knowledge needed for success. International NGOs
could also more intensively hire highly skilled African for their operations and consultancy in Africa.
But above all the international civil society could lead the way towards the development of new
platforms and standards for a global labor-market of circulating brains.
Fukuyama's (1999) evolutionary perspective of adaptation does not exclude the possibility of
evolutionary systems experiencing collapse, dead ends, and poverty traps. A more proactive
approach towards development in Africa in the tradition of Putnam (2000) must be taken; one that
spans individual behavior, schools, governments, civil society, and the media.
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